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1ASHINGTON CASE LAW-1961
cept of valuable consideration is often used in a conveyancing context
to determine whether one taking a conveyance without notice of an
outstanding interest will be protected by a recording statute. In this
context it has been explained thus:
Although there is authority to the contrary, generally the term "valu-
able consideration" is used in contradistinction to a good, valid, or
sufficient consideration. The term means something of substantial
value, such as money, or something that is worth money, as, for
example, legal or other services. Moreover, to constitute a considera-
tion the thing of value which is given must be in respect of the contract
of saleA8
At least one other jurisdiction has required such consideration under
a comparable statute: "actual monetary consideration or . . .consid-
erations which have a reasonably determinable pecuniary value."3
If the county taxing authorities cannot be convinced of the justice
of one's position on the basis of the sources and principles above dis-
cussed, then the taxpayer must become reconciled to payment of the
tax although convinced that it is unjustly levied, unless he is prepared
to sacrifice for the sake of principle. Only in rare instances, such as
the Doric case, are sufficient amounts involved as to make an eventual
victory worth the cost of the battle.
GORDON G. CONGER
3s 92 CJ.S. Vendor & Purcluser § 323 at p. 225 (1955). See also 55 Am. Jim.
VJttdor & Purchaser § 736 (1946) ; Annot., 59 A.L.R. 632, 636 (1929).3ODeVore v. Gay, 39 So. 2d 796, 797 (Fla. 1949) (holding that promises to pay
rent in the future and perform other covenants were not valuable consideration).
TORTS
Evidence of Lack of Malice by Defendant to Mitigate Damages
in Defamation Action. Prior to the appearance of Farrar v. Tribune
Publishing Co.,1 it appeared reasonably clear that in defamation
actions,2 evidence of the defendant's malice or good faith was not
admissible for the purpose of enhancing or mitigating damages. Since
I For a survey of the law of libel in Washington see Comment, 30 WAsH. L. REv.
36 (1955).
257 Wn.2d 549, 358 P.2d 792 (1961).
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malice is not an essential element of civil libel or slander,' evidence of
malice was considered immateriaP and hence inadmissible5 under the
Washington rule prohibiting punitive or exemplary damages.' The
actual malice of the defendant was considered relevant only in those
actions which involved overcoming a qualified privilege.' Farrar seems
to have changed or at least obscured the clarity of these rules.
The Farrar litigation arose out of the 1956 political campaign for
the state senate between Farrar and George W. Kupka. During the
course of the campaign Kupka had a libelous article concerning Farrar
published in the Tacoma News Tribune, as a paid political advertise-
ment. Farrar sued both Kupka and the newspaper, but Kupka was
dropped during the course of the proceedings. Judgment was entered
against the newspaper alone for $23,000.
On appeal the newspaper assigned as error the trial court's ruling
that evidence showing lack of malice on the part of the newspaper was
inadmissible. The supreme court reversed and remanded the cause,
holding that under the express provisions of RCW 4.36.130' defendant
might introduce such evidence to mitigate damages. The court assigned
the following reasons to support its conclusion: (1) in Ott v. Press
Publishing Co.,9 the court had interpreted the same statute to allow the
admission of evidence showing defendant's lack of malice. (2) The
recovery of compensatory damages in Washington for mental pain and
suffering is akin to the exemplary damage rule in other jurisdictions.
The jury, exercising broad discretion in each case, should have all the
surrounding circumstances before it. (3) Malice was inferred from a
publication libelous per se and being thus before the jury, was relevant
to the litigation.
The statute which now appears as RCW 4.36.130 was enacted in the
first session of the territorial legislature in 1854,10 thirty-seven years
3 Yelle v. Cowles Publishing Co., 46 Wn.2d 105, P,2d 671 (1955) ; Ziebell v. Lum-
bermen's Printing Co., 14 Wn.2d 261, 127 P2d 677 (1942).
4 Wilson v. Sun Publishing Co., 85 Wash. 503, 148 Pac. 774 (1915) ; Woodhouse
v. Powles, 43 Wash. 617, 86 Pac. 1065 (1906) ; Davis v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co.,
35 Wash. 203, 77 Pac. 209 (1904).
5 Olympia Water Works v. Mottman, 88 Wash. 694, 153 Pac. 1074 (1915).
6 Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 Pac. 1072 (1891).
7 Ward v. Painters' Local Union 300, 41 Wn.2d 859, 252 P.2d 253 (1953) ; Ecuyer
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 101 Wash. 247, 172 Pac. 359 (1918).
8 RCW 4.36.130 "Answer in justification and mitigation." In an action mentioned
in RCW 4.36.120, [libel or slander, how pleaded] the defendant may, in his answer,
allege both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory, and any mitigating circum-
stances to reduce the amount of damages; and whether he proves the justification or
not, he may give in evidence the mitigating circumstances."
9 40 Wash. 308, 82 Pac. 403 (1905).
10 Wash. Terr. Sess. Laws 1854, Civil Practice, § 62 Rules of Pleading.
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prior to the announcement of the rule prohibiting the award of punitive
damages in Washington. 11 In the Ott case, counsel argued that the
admission of evidence that a publisher of a defamatory statement was
not motivated by malice would violate the rule against punitive dam-
ages. The court rejected that argument and indicated that the statute
gave the defendant the right to introduce such evidence. However, it
appears that the defendant in the Ott case proved the truth of the
allegedly libelous statement, thus establishing a complete defense.'
The court's interpretation of the statute should therefore be regarded
as dictum, being unnecessary to the decision.
In subsequent Washington cases concerning the relevancy of malice
to damages in defamation actions, the statute was not considered, 13 and
it was uniformly held that evidence of actual malice was immaterial. 4
The position of the court appeared to be that "actual malice... is ma-
terial only on the question of punitive or exemplary damages .... I'll
Where the defendant sought to introduce evidence of lack of malice for
the purpose of mitigating damages it was held properly excludable. 6
In the Farrar case this position was abandoned without comment, the
court relying on the statutory interpretation of the Ott case to reach
the desired result.
It must be noted that the Ott-Farrar interpretation of the statute
was not the only possibility. In Republican Publishing Co. v. Mos-
man,17 the Colorado court under an identical punitive damages rule had
interpreted an identical statute' as not allowing the introduction of
evidence of defendant publisher's lack of malice.'" Evidence showing
that the libelous statement had been previously circulated throughout
11 Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 Pac. 1072 (1891).
12 "[B]y reason of the truth of the publication, which must have been found by the
jury, appellants were not entitled to recover any damages whatever' 40 Wash. 308,
311, 82 Pac. 403, 404 (1905).
'. Olympia Water Works v. Mottman, 88 Wash. 694, 153 Pac. 1074 (1915) ; Wilson
v. Sun Publishing Co., 85 Wash. 503, 148 Pac. 774 (1915) ; Woodhouse v. Powles,
43 Wash. 617, 86 Pac. 1065 (1906). A possible explanation is that the Ott interpre-
tation was not recorded in the annotations to the Washington code.1 Ibid.
15 Davis v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 35 Wash. 203, 207, 77 Pac. 209, 211 (1904).16 Olympia Water Works v. Mottman, 88 Wash. 694, 153 Pac. 1074 (1915). In
this case the appellant-defendant had attempted, in the trial court, to introduce evidence
in mitigation to show that the libelous statement was published without malice. The
trial court's ruling that the proffered evidence was inadmissible because immaterial
for the purposes of mitigating damages was affirmed.
27 15 Colo. 399, 24 Pac. 1051 (1890).18 CoLo. CODE Cwn. PROC. § 69.
19 In the Farrar case the court cited the Republican Publishing Co. case for the
proposition that evidence of lack of malice by the publisher was admissible under the
statute. The Colorado court held directly to the contrary.
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the community, thus damaging plaintiff's reputation, was, however, held
admissible under the statute. It appeared that not all the surrounding
circumstances could properly be placed before the jury, but only those
factors considered relevant to the amount of injury suffered by the
plaintiff.
The Washington court in 1891 announced that punitive damages are
not recoverable." The unavailability in a civil action of the procedural
safeguards of a criminal proceeding was assigned by the court as suffi-
cient reason to confine punishment to criminal actions." This position
was strengthened four years later 2 when the court interpreted the term
"exemplary damages" in a statute providing for their recovery23 to
mean actual damage to reputation, pride and feelings. This construction
has been subsequently avoided and the fully developed rule appears to
be that punitive or exemplary damages" are not recoverable except as
expressly provided for by statute.25
In the Farrar decision the court has in effect approved the awarding
of exemplary damages in cases where mental pain and suffering are
involved. The court indicated that there was little or no difference
between the exemplary damage rule of other jurisdictions and the
Washington rule of compensatory damages for "wounded feelings,
shame, humiliation, mental anguish and distress.... 20  "In either case,
the jury is guided solely by its own discretion.... [and] is entitled to
know all of the surrounding circumstances .... "'
By holding that "mental suffering and injury to feelings are proper
elements of compensatory damages,"2 an anomalous situation may be
presented in which the amount of the plaintiff's recovery may in part
20 Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 Pac. 1072 (1891).
21 For a discussion of the punitive damages question from a policy standpoint, see
Morris, Punitive Damages it Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1173 (1931).
22 Levy v. Fleischner, 12 Wash. 15, 40 Pac. 384 (1895).
23 RCW 7.12.080 (wrongful and malicious attachment).
24 The terms "exemplary" and "punitive" damages are normally used synonymously.
E.g., exemplary damages are additional damages to "solace the plaintiff for mental
anguish... or else punish the defendant for his evil behavior or to make an example,
for which reason they are also called punitive ... damages....." Black, Law
Dictionary 467 (4th ed. 1951). A possible distinction might be that the purpose of
exemplary damages is to make an example of the wrongdoer for the purpose of
deterring similar conduct by others, while punitive damages are directed toward
punishing the defendant.
25Anderson v. Dalton, 40 Wn.2d 894, 246 P.2d 853 (1952); Walker v. Gilman,
25 Wn2d 557, 171 P.2d 797 (1946). Treble damages are also recoverable in Wash-
ington when authorized by statute. E.g., RCW 64.12.020 (voluntary waste by tenant
or sub-tenant) ; RCW 79.01.756 (conversion of timber) ; RCW 64.12.030 (injury to
or removal of trees from state or private lands).
203 57 Wn.2d 549, 553-554, 358 P.2d 792, 795 (1961).
27 Id. at 555, 358 P.2d at 796.
28 57 Wn.2d 549, 557, 358 P2d 792, 797 (1961).
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depend upon which party he sues. The majority opinion did not discuss
the issue, but Judge Mallery in dissent stated that "the advertising
medium has never before been permitted to establish a lesser liability
than that of the advertiser by showing that it did not share the adver-
tiser's malice. Mitigating circumstances went to the amount of the
damage, not to the question of which party was defending the action."29
If the measure of damages is the amount that the plaintiff has been
injured, it is submitted that the party against whom the action is
brought should not affect the extent of the plaintiff's recovery.
In the Farrar case the court concludes by stating, "since the exist-
ence of malice was implied from the publication which was libelous
per se and was thus before the jury, the jury should have before it all
relevant circumstances. '30 The court is apparently saying that actual
malice may be inferred from a libelous publication.
The terms "actual" and "implied" malice have been a source of con-
fusion to the courts of many jurisdictions. Originally, actual malice
was a necessary element in a civil defamation action, but by 1825 it
had become an irrebutable presumption and thus a fiction.3 Modernly,
courts have referred to malice in two senses: "implied" malice mean-
ing that the libelous statement is actionable, and "actual" malice mean-
ing ill will or improper purposes." In view of the fact that these two
meanings are unrelated, it seems improbable that the Washington court
would hold that since "implied" malice will be presumed from a publi-
cation libelous per se, evidence of lack of "actual" malice would be
admissible to rebut this presumption.
A California case, Shumate v. Johnson Publishing Co.,3 was cited by
the court for the proposition that actual malice may be inferred from
a publication which is libelous per se.3 In referring to the question of
.9 ld. at 561, 358 P.2d at 799.
o 57 Wn.2d 549, 559, 358 P.2d 792, 799 (1961).
31 PROSSER, TORTS § 94 (2d ed. 1955).
321 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 527 (1956).
33139 Cal. App. 2d 121, 293 P2d 531 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).34 Two Washington cases were also cited by the court for this proposition: Cham-
bers v. Leiser, 43 Wash. 285, 86 Pac. 627 (1906). This action involved a qualified
privilege and actual malice was therefore in issue. The court said at 289 "[Since the
communication was privileged it] . .. was therefore incumbent upon plaintiff, by
means of the matters in the letter or by any other competent evidence, to show that
defendant had been actuated by malice or ill will towards plaintiff . . . ." Stewart v.
Major, 17 Wash. 238, 49 Pac. 503 (1897), states that if it is proved that the defendant
made a false statement, knowing it to be false, it will be assumed to be malicious.
It is not clear from this statement which type of malice is intended. Furthermore,
liability for defamation is not usually based upon knowledge by the defendant that the
statement was false, but upon a strict liability theory. Miles v. Wasmer, 172 Wash.
466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933) ; PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 31, § 94.
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exemplary damages, the California court stated that a trier of fact might
infer actual malice "from the intrinsic evidence which the publication
affords... ."" Because the question of actual malice was raised in
considering an award of exemplary damages," the holding of the
Shumate case was proper. The California court has distinguished
between actual and implied malice as indicated by Childers v. San Jose
Mercury Printing & Publishing Co.,37 cited in the Shumate opinion.
In the Childers case, the court stated that "actual malice, or malice in
fact, is only material in libel as establishing a right to recover exem-
plary damages, or to defeat defendant's plea that a publication is
privileged." 8 In the Farrar decision the court failed to recognize
that an inference of actual malice from a publication does not establish
its relevance. Prior Washington cases consistently holding that actual
malice is not relevant in a libel action 9 (where no qualified privilege is
involved) were not distinguished.
No prior decisions were expressly overruled by the Farrar case. As
a result, conflicting rules in three separate aspects of an already con-
fused defamation area have been created: (1) Ignoring a consistent
line of Washington cases to the contrary, the court holds that evidence
of lack of malice by a publisher of a defamatory statement is admis-
sible, under the statute, for the purpose of mitigating damages. (2)
Although punitive or exemplary damages are not recoverable in Wash-
ington, unless authorized by statute, the court states that the compen-
satory damage rule, where mental pain and suffering are involved, is
indistinguishable from the exemplary damage rule of other jurisdic-
tions. (3) Although in Washington actual malice is not an essential
element in civil libel or slander, the court indicates that actual malice
is to be inferred from a publication which is libelous per se, and being
thus before the jury is a proper element for consideration.
In view of the conflicting positions taken by the court and the un-
35 Shumate v. Johnson Publishing Co., 139 Cal. App. 2d 121, 293 P.2d 531, 541
(Dist. Ct App. 1956).
36 CAL. Civr CODE § 3294 provides for the award of exemplary damages in certain
situations.
37105 Cal. 284, 38 Pac. 903 (1894).
38 Id. at 904.
39 Hollenbeck v. Post-Intelligencer Co., 162 Wash. 14, 19, 297 Pac. 793, 795 (1931)
("The article having a necessary tendency to damage appellant and her business, any
allegation of malice was immaterial.") ; Byrne v. Funk, 38 Wsh. 506, 514, 80 Pac. 772,
774 (1905) (Held, in a libel action where no qualified privilege was involved that
"the special finding of the jury that respondent was not actuated by malice is not




certainties involved in this area, it is hoped that the court will have
occasion to review the questions here presented and clarify its position
on these issues. JOHN H. BiNNs JR.
Interspousal Actions-Personal Torts. In Goode v. Martinis,' the
Washington Supreme Court held that a wife has a cause of action in
tort for an assault committed upon her by her husband while the parties
are legally separated and divorce proceedings are pending. While re-
stricting its holdings to the particular facts, the court rejected the
rationale advanced in favor of the common law doctrine of spousal
disability.'
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. The complaint alleged the
following facts. On the evening of January 9, 1958, Paul V. Martinis
entered the residence of the plaintiff, Edna V. Goode, his wife, and
assaulted her by forcibly having sexual intercourse with her against
her will. The assault occurred approximately eight weeks after the
parties had separated. However, it was not until almost six weeks after
the alleged assault that a divorce action was tried and a final divorce
decree awarded.
On appeal the court held that the leading Washington case on inter-
spousal personal torts action, Schultz v. Christopher,' was not con-
trolling because of the narrow purpose of the statute" upon which the
holding was based. The court recognized the existence of three statutes'
which make reference to the right of spouses to maintain actions in
their individual capacity. The court did not construe the aggregate
effect of these statutes upon abrogation of the common law doctrine of
spousal disability. However the tenor of the opinion manifests serious
1158 Wash. Dec. 222, 361 P.2d 941 (1961).
2 Id at 226, 361 P.2d at 944-45.
3 65 Wash. 496,118 P. 629 (1911).
4 RCW 26.16.160, providing that "All laws which impose or recognize civil disabili-
ties upon a wife, which are not imposed or recognized as existing as to the husband, are
hereby abolished, and for any unjust usurpation of her natural or property rights, she
shall have the same right to appeal in her own individual name, to the courts of law
or equity for redress and protection that the husband has: Provided always, That
nothing in this chapter shall be construed to confer upon the wife any right to vote or
hold office, except as otherwise provided by law."
; RCW 26.16.130, providing that "A wife may receive the wages of her personal
labor and maintain an action therefor in her own name and hold the same in her own
right, and she may prosecute and defend all actions at law for the preservation and
protection of her rights and property rights as if unmarried." RCW 26.16.150, pro-
viding that 'Every married person shall hereafter have the same right and liberty to
acquire, hold, enjoy and dispose of every species of property, and to sue and be sued,
as if he or she were unmarried." RCW 26.16.160, supra note 4.
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